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.IbstmcY-Recently, a simple way of creating very 
efficient distinguishers for cryptographic primitives 
such as block ciphers or hash functions, was presented 
by the authors. Here, this cryptanalytic attack is 
shown to be succesful when applied over reduced 
round versions of the block cipher XTEA. Additionally, 
a variant of this genetic attack is introduced and its 
results over TEA shown to be the most powerful 
published to date. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The construction of a distinguisher [Z] (i.e. an algorithm 
that is able of distinguishing a random permutation or 
random mapping from a given clyptographic primitive 
such as a block cipher or hash function) is one of the 
objectives of any cryptanalyst. 
Although a distinguisher may or may not be used to 
recover some of the plaintext or key bits, the existence of 
an efficient and effective distinguisher always means the 
cryptographic primitive in question is weak [2,3] and must 
be discarded for any cryptographic usage. 
A. The block cipher XTEA 
XTEA stands for extended Tiny Encryption 
Algorithm. It is the name of an improvement over TEA, a 
previous block cipher invented by David Wheeler and 
Roger Needham, members of the Computer Security 
Laboratory of Cambridge University. 
The original TEA block cipher was presented in the 
1994 Fast Software Encryption Workshop [4], but an 
related-key attack was proposed at [ 5 ]  and the new XTEA 
algorithm was the answer of TEA developers's to avoid 
this anack, although they argued it had little to none 
practical implications. 
XTEA, as TEA, is a very fast block cipher that does 
not use predefined tables or Sboxes and does not need 
much initialisation time. It is a Feistel lype algorithm. It 
works over 64  bit blocks and uses keys of I28 bits. They 
authors conjectured it had a security (with 8, 16 or 32 
rounds) comparable with the DES (the Data Encryption 
Standard), being quite faster (at least with 8 rounds). 
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However, in the light of some recent results [ S A  this 
It is very portable, simple and efficient as its compact 
assertion seems to be extremely optimistic. 
code shows: 
void encipher(const unsigned long *const v, w, k) 
{register unsigned long y=v[O], r=v[l]. sum=O, 
delta=Ox9E3 779B9,n=32; 
while(n-- >O) 
( y  += (z < < 4 " r  >>5)tzAsum+k[sum&3]; 
sum +=delta; 
z += (Y<<4"y ~ ~ S ) t y " s u m + k [ s u m ~ ~ l l & 3 ] :  
I 
w[O]=y; w[l]=z;} 
B. Overview of our methodologV 
Our method, already presented in [I], is based in the 
search for subsets of the input space that produce a high 
(statistically significant) deviation of the distribution of a 
given subset of the output produced by a given 
Cryptographic primitive. 
For this search we use a genetic-algorithm based 
approach in which individuals of the population codify bit 
masks that are used to perform a logical AND with 
randomly generated inputs. 
In this way, we get an extremely efficient representation 
of those input subsets characterized by having some of the 
input bits fixed to a zero value. Input subsets of this form 
are evaluated performing chi-square tests over the output 
distribution of the subset under observation. 
These tests vary, because additional rounds of XTEA 
exponentially increase the dispersion of the output, and 
thus the difficulty of finding significant deviations. 
The genetic algorithm will evolve individuals and 
populations towards those that, by fixing the input bits 
that have a greater effect over the observed output, 
produce a higher deviation from the expected probability 
distribution. 
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11. RESULTSOVERXTEA 
We will briefly present the different approximations 
used in every case and the results obtained over them, 
proposing efficient distinguishers for all these versions of 
the algorithm. 
A. One Cycle XTEA 
Every input subset (or bitmask) is tested by generating 
2" random inputs, and then performing a logical AND 
between each of these inputs and the bitmask. Then 
XTEAl is applied over thus generated vectors, and the 
values of the least significant eight bits of the first output 
word of XTEA, that is w[0]&255, are computed. 
We have focused in this particular part of the output 
because there are authors, notably [7], that have shown 
that block ciphers using rotation as one of their round 
operations (as is the case of XTEA) tend to exhibit bad 
distributions in their least significant bits of their output 
words. The fitness function we propose for the genetic 
algorithm is highly related with the chi-square statistic ?2 
which in our case measures the deviation of the observed 
output distribution from a uniform, in this way; 
if x2 = 522480 then fitness = w4 
else fitness = x 2  
The idea behind this fitness function is that the value of 
the chi square statistic cannot increase indefinitely, but has 
a maximum. The maximum value of the chi square statistic 
corresponding to a distribution with 255 degrees of 
freedom and 2" observations is precisely 522480, which is 
obtained when all the possible 256 outputs collapse in a 
single one. 
Once we find bitmasks that produce this maximum 
deviation, our search must continue by looking for those 
bitmasks that are heavier (have more I's), and this is the 
reason of including the weight w in the formula above, 
once the maximum deviation is obtained. 
Heavier hitmasks are preferred because they allow for a 
larger set of different inputs; so in this sense we can say 
they are more general, and also give more information 
about the input subset (the 0's in the bitmask or inactive 
bits) that has a stronger influence over the observed 
output. ' 
Obviously, we must try to maximise this fitness value. 
The code we used for testing was the implementation of 
the genetic algorithm of William M. Spears, from the Navy 
Center for Applied Research. Other parameters needed for 
running the genetic algorithm are the size of the 
population, the mutation rate and the crossover 
probability. Those values were fixed, respectively, to 100, 
0.005 and 0.85 after some trial and error testing that 
showed they produced good results. 
The best bitmask we found after around 730 generations 
and 34000 evaluations for the fitness function presented 
above was ml: 
(OxFFFFFFOO, ~x~F~FE~OO,~~FFFFFFO~,O~FFFEFFFF. 0 
XFEFFFFBFF. 0xF7FFFFFF) 
which has a weight of 157 and produces a chi square of 
522240. 
It was then tested with different, previously unseen 
input subsets of size 2" and in evely case it produced 
maximal deviations (i.e. a collapse of the output). 
This bitmask can be used to construct an exceptionally 
efficient and simple distinguisher for XTEAI, which 
pseudocode is presented below: 
INPUT: F Z,'92 ? Z2@, a random mapping or 
XTEAl  
ALGORITHM: 
Generate a random vector V E  Z2192 
Apply the mask m,, getting v'= v&m, which 
can take any of 2I5'possible values 
Compute F(v3-7u[O]w[l] 
Compute r = w[0]&255 
OUTPUT: If r=O then F is XTEAI else F is not 
XTEA I 
It is interesting to point out that this distinguisher is 
extremely efticient, given that with only one input text has 
a false positive probability of U256 (or around 0.4%) and 
a zero probability of false negatives. 
B. Two Cydes XTEA 
XTEA with two cycles (XTEA2) is much harder than 
XTEAI. The additional cycle significantly increases the 
strength of the algorithm and no usable bitmaks producing 
maximal deviation (collapses) were found, so the fitness 
function used for XTEAI is not adequate here. 
Although a fitness function consisting simply of the 
chi-square statistic can break XTEA2, it needs some exfra 
care with technical details (mainly a selection proportional 
to rank and not to fitness and different mutation and 
crossover probabilities) to produce good results. Another 
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drawback of this fitness function is that it shows a very 
low convergence towards good solutions (those which 
produce results statistically better than can be expected at 
random). 
Furthermore, this simplistic approximation is not 
applicable to XTEA3. So, after solving the case for 
XTEA3, we tumed back to XTEA2 and observed that the 
same fitness function would be very adequate, so we will 
present now a new fitness function that reflects an idea 
that is enough for breaking both XTEA2 and XTEA3. The 
fitness function used in this case is shown below: 
if x 2  2 403.4579 then fitness = l/w’ + w4 
else fitness = 1Jw3 
The idea behind this fitness function is to divide the 
search for good and heavy bitmasks in two phases. In the 
first one, the chi-square values will be around the 0.5 
percentile, and the fitness function above will simply look 
for low-weighted bihnasks. 
When the bitmasks are sufficiently low to produce high 
values of the chi square statistic (above the threshold of 
403.4579), then the objective is to find heavier bihnasks 
between those which produce a very high statistical value 
(Table I shows some p-values of a chi-square distribution 
with 255 degrees of freedom). 
In this way, we do not maximize the chi-square value 
but the weight of the masks that produce a statistic value 
over a threshold. In this case, the threshold is the 
corresponding value for a chi-square distribution with 255 
degrees of freedom and a p-value of 5*10-9, so it clearly 
shows a very strong deviation from randomness. 
TABLE I: SOME P-VALUES FOR A CHI-SQUARE 
STATISTIC WITH 255 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
P-value ValUe 
0.5 254.33 
10~1 310.45 
10.’ 330.51 
I o4 347.65 
10-5 362.98 
Using this approximation, we got the following bitmask 
m2 after around 530 generations and 25000 evaluations: 
{OxFFFFEXFC, OxCFFF39DC. OxFFFFF9FC,OxFFF7FF 
FE,&DFFFFFEF,GxFFFFFFCEJ 
which has a weight of 166. 
After testing this bitmask with other previously unseen 
inputs, the average chi square statistic obtained was 442.4. 
It is then feasible to construct an efficient distinguisher for 
XTEA2, as shown in the following pseudocode: 
INPUT: F: Z,’92 ? 
XTEA2 
ALGORITHM: 
Generate 2“ random vectors vj 
Apply mask to every vector v;, getting 
v,’=v;&m,that can take any of 2Iw possible values 
Compute F(v;’)= w[O], w[lIi 
Compute r, = w[O], &255 
Perform a c h k q u a r e  test for checking if the 
observed distribution of rj is consistent with the 
expected uniform distribution, calculating the 
corresponding chi-square statistic 72 
OUTPUT: If ?2> 390.0315 then F is TEA2 else F is 
not TEA2 
ZZM, a random mapping or 
The 390.0315 is the value corresponding to a p-value of 
so the distinguisher described before will have a false 
and a false negative probability positive probability of 
even closer to zero. 
C. Three Cydes XTEA 
Using essentially the same approximation described 
before, we get the following bitmask m3 for XTEA with 3 
cycles after around 1600 generations and 76000 
evaluations 
{OXFFC~EOOX, OxF9C6OOOO,OxFFC7EOi8.OxFFFFF5FA 
,&FFFFFFXA,0xFFF6009A} 
which has a weight of I 1  8 and produces an average chi- 
The distinguisher will he, then 
INPUT: F: Z2”* ? ZZM, a random mapping or 
XTEA3 
ALGORITHM: 
Generate 2“ random vectors v, E Z2’” 
Apply mask m, to  every vector v;, getting 
v;’=v,&m, that can take any of 2”’ possible values 
Compute F(v,’)= w[0lj w[lIi 
Compute r, = w[0li &255 
Perform a chi-square test for checking if the 
observed distribution of ri is consistent with the 
square statistic of 530.6 over previously unseen cases. 
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expected uniform distribution, calculating the 
corresponding chi-square statistic ?2 
OUTPUT: If ?2> 330.5197 then F k TEA3 else F is 
not TEA3 
The 330.5197 threshold is the value corresponding to a 
p-value of so this distinguisher will have a false 
positive probability of IO” and a false negative probability 
of around 0.5%. 
D. Four Cycles XTEA 
This is a considerably harder case. When using the same 
approximation that was successful over the prior two 
cases, we only managed to obtain bitmasks of relatively 
low weight. 
This is interesting and can be useful for different 
cryptanalytic purposes, for example for starting a search 
of impossible differentials, hut it is not enough in this case, 
as it does not allow for different inputs. If not having 
at least different elements in the input subset, we can 
not ask to obtain a good distribution of the output, as it 
must somehow reflect the low entropy of the input 
(although it do not need to be precisely in w[O]&255, the 
bits we observe). 
So we need a different approximation, a subtler one, 
able of distinguishing from randomness behaviours that 
may have past undetected by other, less sensible, tests. 
Our proposal is based in a test used to measure the 
Strict Avalanche Criterion or SAC [8]. The SAC will be 
measured just by flipping at random a bit that is at a 
position where there is an active bit (i.e. one that has a 1 in 
the corresponding input mask), then measuring the 
Hamming distance ofthe two outputs. 
A mapping Z,“ 1 Zzn has the SAC over a certain input 
subset S E Z ~ ~  iff the Hamming distance of the output of 
inputs x and x ’  that only differ in a position (i.e. 
w(*o*’)=l) and belong to the input subset S follow a 
Binomial distribution with parameters % and n. In the case 
of TEA, we should have a B(1/2,64). It is important to 
note that the satisfactibily of this criterion implies the 
avalanche effect (changes in the input of only one bit 
should produce a change of around half of the output), 
because the average of the distribution B(1/2,n) is d2 .  
For testing if a given bitmask represents an input subset 
which elements meet the SAC, we propose to perform a 
chi-square test for the goodness of fit of the observed 
output distribution of the Hamming values with respect to 
the theoretical Binomial distribution. 
In this case, we have a chi square statistic with 64 
degrees of freedom. Table 2 shows some p-values of this 
distribution. 
TABLE 2: SOME P-VALUES FOR A CHI-SQUARE 
STATISTIC WITH 64 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
P-value Value 
0.5 63.33 
1 0‘ 93.21 
I o5 104.71 
104 114.83 
I O ”  124.10 
Using this approximation, we got the following hitmask 
ml 
(OxCC61 4648,oX22300132,0xFB00A571,0x3200001 I ,  0 
xF40008CI,OxI 7701000) 
with a weight of 57 (the weight is not a limit here, as far 
as slfficiently many input elements exist to perform the 
test), a fitness of 313.06 and an average chi-square value 
over previously unseen examples of 278.87 
In this case, we did not introduced any preference for 
heavier bitmasks. The corresponding distinguisher 
pseudocode will then be: 
INPUT: F Z;” ? 
XTEA4 
ALGORITHM: 
Generate 2“ random vectors 
Apply mask m, to every v,, getting y’= y&m, that  
can  take 2” possible values 
For  every y’ 
Z,M, a random mapping or 
Select a position p a t  random from those 
that have a 1 in the bitmask (active 
positions) 
Generate y” by changing the value of y’ at 
position p 
End For 
Compute r, =H(F(q’), F(y”)), the Hamming 
distance between F(y’) and F(y”) 
Perform a chi-square test for checking if the 
observed distribution of ri is  consistent with t h e  
expected distribution, calculating the 
corresponding chi-square statistic ?2 
OUTPUT: If ?2>148.3564 then F is XTEA4 else F 
i s  not XTEA4 
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where 148.3564 is the threshold value corresponding to 
a p-value of IO-'. The distinguisher will, then, have a false 
positive probability of 10.' and a negligible false negative 
probability. 
Ill. IMPROVED AITACKOVERTEA 
Continuing with our research in the genetic 
cryptanalysis of TEA, while using essentially the same 
approach presented in [ I ]  and in this paper, we had also 
tried to find characteristics (bitmasks) that produce a 
significative deviation of the observed output by XORing 
them with the inputs, instead of ANDing them as 
described earlier. 
This approach strongly resembles what we could call a 
genetic implementation of the differential attack [9], or a 
genetic search for impossible differentials in the vein of 
[6], and has lead us to a very interesting result. 
We have found two characteristics c,. g in TEA that 
make that any two keys k, k'with the given characteristic 
c, (i.e. k 8 k '  = e,) produce exactly the same output, no 
matter how many TEA rounds are used. 
These characteristics are: 
c, = {0x80000000,0x80000000, 0x00000000, 
0x00000000) 
and 
CJ = {OxOOOOOOOO,OxOOOOOOOO, 0x80000000, 
0x80000000) 
So if we generate any key at random, say 
k={Oxflea8d74.Oxeb4876~6, Ox6614abBe. Ox908bd353) 
and we compute 
k '  = k @ c~ ={0x70ea8d74,0x664576c6,0x6b14ab8e, 
Ox908bd353) 
or 
k" = k 8c2 ={Oxpea8d74,0xeb4876c6, Oxebl4abBe. 
0x1 OBbd353) 
then for every input block i and any number of rounds n 
TEA,(i.k) = TEA,(i,k.i = TEA,,(i.k'7 
and, in particular, this happends with the full 32 rounds 
recommended by the authors. 
This is a surprising powerful result, as normally 
characteristics are discovered for a certain number of 
rounds and then they vanish exponentially as the number 
of rounds increases. 
Iv. CONCLUSIONS 
We have presented a cryptanalitic attack over reduced 
round versions ofthe block cipher XTEA based in the new 
method of constructing distinguishers for cryptographic 
mappings proposed at [I]. 
We have also shown that XTEA is weak with four or 
less cycles, that is lo say, with 8 rounds or less. This is a 
result quite similar to those obtained for TEA applying the 
same genetic clyptanalysis, which forces us to conclude 
that, at least from the genetic cryptanalysis point of view, 
both TEA and XTEA have a very close security level, 
This could also be interpreted as saying that the 
improvements introduced in XTEA for avoiding the attack 
presented in [ 5 ]  are limited to make this related-key attack 
impracticable but do not improve the overall scurity of 
the cipher, which rest very similar to those of TEA. 
Although we acknowledge that previous works, 
specially [6] have shown that both TEA and XTEA 
cannot be considered as secure block ciphers, and have 
presented stronger attacks on them, we still think the 
proposed approach remains valuable because it is one of 
the firsts published attacks using AI  techniques that is able 
of producing worthy cryptanalytic results when 
confronted against modem ciphers. 
Furthermore, nowadays the most powerful attack on 
these cipher extend, respectively, to I O  and 12 rounds and 
the approach proposed here could be extended to 8 
rounds, which makes these results far from trivial and 
pretty close to the most powerful ones. 
Additionally, and regarding the improved attack on 
TEA presented in this paper, it is, as far as we know, the 
most powerful attack presented to date against the block 
cipher. It is obviously a serious weakness which concrete 
implications, for example it reduces the effective key- 
length to 126 bits, and could being straightforwardly used 
to construct very efficient hlackbox distinguishers. This 
equivalent-keys weakness is not present, at least to the 
best of our knowledge, in XTEA. 
In fact, as one could expect, some minor changes to the 
TEA round functwn could avoid it. For example, if we 
substitute the original line of code ( I )  by (1') then the 
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problem remains, but when substituting any of them by, 
for example (2) this weakness, at least thus stated, 
dissappears: 
void enripher(unsigned long *consl v, w, k) 
register unsigned long y=v[OJ,z=v[lJ,sum =0, 
delta=Ox9E3779B9, 
o=k[O]. b=k[lJ,c=k[2],d=k[3],n=32: 
while(n-->O) 
sum += delta: 
y + =  ( ~ < ( 4 ) + a " i + s u m " ( z > > S ) + b ;  ( I )  
y += (z << 4)+a + z+sum ^(z >> 5)+b: (I  1 
y += (z << 4)+a *z+sum (z >> S)+b; (2) 
y += (z < < 4 ) + a  "b"z+sum ^(r >> Si: (3) 
z += (y << 4 ) + c A y + s u m A ( y  >> S)+d; 
I 
w[O]=y: w[lJ=z:) 
I 
The reason for this is the fact that in 32-bit 
implementations, operations are made, naturally, mod P2 
and for that reason, both addition mod Z3' and xor behave 
identically on the most significant bit, thus producing the 
indesirable effect of essentially converting ( I )  in (3) for the 
leading bit, allowing it to cancellate when simultaneously 
changing it in a=k[O] and b=k[l] (or, analogously, at 
c=k[2] and d=k[3]). 
This result is similar to a previously published result 
[5] where the authors presented three attacks on TEA, the 
first of which is based in simultaneously flipping the next 
most significant bits (bit 30) of k[2] and k[3], the second 
based in changing the values of both k[l] (for 
k[ 1]023'02'6) and v[ 11 (for v[ I ]  O2"). 
Both attacks, although similar to the proposed one, 
failed to exhibit full round characteristics. 
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